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Financing Community Development:
Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future 
Summary of the 2007 Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference
The conference was organized 
around six key questions: (1) Is sub-
prime loan pricing fair or predatory? 
he Federal Reserve System’s 2007 Community 
Development Research Conference, 
“Financing Community Development: 
Learning from the Past, Looking to the 
Future,” was held in Washington, D.C., on March 29-30, 
2007.  This conference was the fifth in a biennial series 
that the Federal Reserve System established in 1999. 
The responsibility for organizing the conference program 
rotates among the Federal Reserve Banks. The staffs of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Community 
Affairs Department and Research Department took the 
lead in organizing the 2007 program. The intention of 
the conference series is to encourage the application 
of rigorous economic analysis to issues related to 
community development because without such state-of-
the-art research, policymakers cannot hope to devise 
effective economic development policies and programs. 
In this article, Loretta Mester provides a summary of the 
conference.
(2) Are legislative remedies to limit 
predatory lending really remedies? 
(3) What determines who defaults or 
goes bankrupt, and how do they fare? 
(4) What should and can be done to 
enhance borrowers’ knowledge of their 
credit risk? (5) Does the financing of 
small businesses differ for minority-
owned businesses and for businesses 
in low-income areas? and (6) Can 
alternative financial services products 
help the underbanked?  Although the 
research did not provide definitive 
answers to these questions, the presen-
tations and discussions did advance 
our knowledge and provided several in-
teresting avenues for further research.*  
Jeffrey Lacker, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
and chair of the Conference of Presi-
dents’ Committee on Research, Public 
Information, and Community Affairs, 
opened the conference.  He pointed 
out the value of careful, objective 
research on consumer financial mar-
kets, which have experienced much 
innovation in recent years. Financial 
innovation creates opportunities but 
also entails risk.  Lacker would like 
researchers to study borrowing and 
other household financial decisions 
from an ex ante viewpoint, that is, to 
look at the full distribution of possible 
outcomes and their relative prob-
abilities. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
know whether any particular credit 
market product is beneficial on net 
or whether the benefits of any pro-
posed method for curtailing adverse 
outcomes outweigh the costs from 
restricting credit that the method may 
entail.  He also pointed out one of 
the limitations of the data collected 
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act.  Even with recent enhancements, 
these data include information from 
lenders only and do not contain much 
information about borrowers, so Lacker 
* Revisions of some of the papers presented at 
this conference have been published in a special 
issue of the Journal of Economics and Busi-
ness, 60, Nos. 1-2, 2008. Part of this summary 
is taken from my introduction to this special 
issue. The conference papers are available 
on the Federal Reserve System’s website at 
www.federalreserve.gov/communityaffairs/
national/2007researchconf/default.htm.  Business Review  Q1  2008   35 www.philadelphiafed.org
is pessimistic about their usefulness 
for understanding the effectiveness of 
credit markets. Lacker suggested that 
researchers try to partner with credit 
rating bureaus so that lender-supplied 
data can be combined with data on 
households to better illuminate bor-
rowers’ credit decisions and outcomes.  
In his view, further research will help 
us better understand the costs and 
benefits of market practices and gov-
ernment interventions.
Indeed, turmoil in the subprime 
mortgage market took center stage 
in mid-2007, underscoring the im-
portance of further research on this 
market segment.  Six papers at the 
conference studied various aspects of 
the subprime mortgage market, includ-
ing pricing, possible predatory practices 
and policy responses, foreclosures, and 
delinquencies.
SESSION 1: IS SUBPRIME LOAN 
PRICING FAIR OR PREDATORY? 
“Predatory Lending Practices 
and Subprime Foreclosures: Distin-
guishing Impacts by Loan Cat-
egory,” by Morgan Rose, examines 
the foreclosure behavior of subprime 
mortgages. While the rise in subprime 
mortgage lending has increased access 
to credit for some borrowers, it has 
also raised concerns about possible 
predatory pricing practices within this 
market segment.  The recent increase 
in subprime mortgage foreclosures has 
prompted calls for more regulation to 
curb predatory lending, and some mu-
nicipalities and states have passed such 
legislation.  But distinguishing preda-
tory lending from legitimate lending is 
a difficult task. Rose’s analysis indi-
cates that the impact of prepayment 
penalty periods, balloon payments, and 
reduced documentation — charac-
teristics often cited as consistent with 
predatory lending — on the foreclo-
sure behavior of subprime refinance 
and home purchase mortgages is not at 
all straightforward.  To the extent that 
these factors are not associated with 
foreclosures resulting in loss of wealth 
and tax base, the empirical basis for 
some of the new regulations enacted 
at the municipal and state level is ques-
tionable.  These laws might restrict 
legitimate access to credit for low-in-
come borrowers without offering much 
benefit.  The results also suggest that 
our understanding of these loans must 
advance before effective federal legisla-
tion to limit predatory lending can be 
designed, and that the recent regula-
tory guidelines emphasizing prudent 
loan terms and underwriting standards 
may be a better approach than placing 
restrictions on loan characteristics.  
Rose uses quarterly data collected 
by LoanPerformance, Inc. on subprime 
refinance and home purchase mort-
gages originated in 1999Q1 through 
2003Q2 on properties located in the 
Chicago metropolitan area and which 
have been securitized into private-label 
mortgage-backed securities.  Chicago 
provides a good laboratory for study, 
having experienced a significant 
increase in foreclosures in recent years.  
Focusing on a single geographic region 
can help control for regional differenc-
es in housing markets.  However, the 
limited time period means the loans 
studied are not seasoned and many 
of the new types of mortgage instru-
ments, like “piggyback” mortgages, 
cannot be included. Rose combines 
these data with 2000 Census Bureau 
data, which include information by ZIP 
code on median household income, 
race, education, and adult population. 
Over 31,000 loans were used in the 
empirical analysis, with over 200,000 
loan-quarters of observations.
Rose estimates multinomial 
logit models that explain for each of 
four loan types (fixed-rate purchase, 
fixed-rate refinance, adjustable-rate 
purchase, adjustable-rate refinance) 
the probability of a loan’s entering 
foreclosure, prepayment, or remaining 
active in the quarter. Explanatory vari-
ables include macroeconomic, demo-
graphic, and vintage control variables, 
and features of the loans, including 
whether the loan requires a balloon 
payment, whether it has a prepayment 
penalty period longer than 36 months 
from origination, whether it is a low- or 
no-documentation loan, the loan-to-
value ratio, interest rate at origination, 
the borrower’s FICO score at origina-
tion, and, for refinance loans, whether 
the borrower withdrew cash.  The first 
three of these loan characteristics are 
often cited as features of predatory 
loans.  Standard errors were adjusted 
to allow for clustering by loans, since 
loans can remain in the data set for 
multiple quarters.   
The empirical findings indicate 
that the relationship between outcome 
(foreclosure, prepayment, active), loan 
characteristics, and demographic vari-
ables differs among the four loan types, 
making it difficult to reach a general 
conclusion about whether particular 
loan characteristics or combinations 
The recent increase in subprime mortgage 
foreclosures has prompted calls for more 
regulation to curb predatory lending, and some 
municipalities and states have passed such 
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of characteristics are associated with 
higher probability of foreclosure.  For 
example, having a prepayment penalty 
period longer than 36 months is as-
sociated with a statistically significant 
higher probability of foreclosure for 
purchase fixed-rate mortgages and re-
finance adjustable-rate mortgages, but 
not for refinance fixed-rate mortgages 
or purchase adjustable-rate mortgages.  
Low- or no-documentation is associ-
ated with a statistically significant 
higher probability of foreclosure for 
refinance loans of either type and a 
statistically significant lower probabil-
ity of foreclosure for purchase fixed-
rate mortgages, and is not significantly 
associated with the probability of 
foreclosure for purchase adjustable-rate 
mortgages.  Rose also examines the 
impact of combinations of the three 
loan characteristics often considered 
characteristics of predatory loans.  In 
most, but not all cases, the results 
indicate that the effect of the combi-
nation on the predicted probability of 
foreclosure is greater than the sum of 
the individual impacts.  
Based on the analysis, Rose con-
cludes that the relationships between 
foreclosures and loan characteristics 
often cited as predatory are much more 
complex than previous analysis sug-
gests, and that prohibitions on these 
loan characteristics may not have the 
desired effects intended by legislators.  
This suggests the need for a model 
of borrower and lender behavior to 
better understand the consequences of 
restricting various loan characteristics 
on the supply and demand for these 
types of credit. 
The association between subprime 
lending and minorities is the focus 
of “Race, Ethnicity, and Subprime 
Home Loan Pricing,” by Debbie 
Gruenstein Bocian, Keith Ernst, and 
Wei Li.  The paper examines whether 
African-American and Latino bor-
rowers receive a disproportionately 
larger share of higher-rate home loans, 
controlling for borrower riskiness. This 
paper uses the 2004 data collected 
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA), which for the first time 
included information on the costs 
of subprime home loans.  For first-
lien loans, lenders were required to 
report the spread between the annual 
percentage rate (APR) of the loan and 
the yield on a U.S. Treasury security of 
comparable maturity if the spread was 
three percentage points or higher. By 
matching these data to a proprietary 
database on subprime lending, the 
authors are able to address a signifi-
cant weakness of earlier studies of race 
and loan pricing, namely, the inability 
to control for the risk characteristics 
of the borrowers and loans at the 
time of origination. In particular, the 
proprietary data allow them to control 
for a borrower’s FICO score, loan-to-
value ratio, and whether the loan was 
covered by private mortgage insurance. 
The resulting data set contains over 
177,000 subprime loans originated in 
2004.  
The analysis covers subprime 
loans that have been securitized where 
the loans are secured by first liens 
on owner-occupied properties, and 
excluding loans secured by manufac-
tured housing units, backed by private 
mortgage insurance, those with 
nonstandard amortization schedules, 
and those with origination amounts 
above the Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac limit (which was $333,700 in 
2004). Separate analyses are performed 
on six different subgroups of loans, 
defined by whether the loan is fixed or 
variable rate, included a prepayment 
penalty or not, and was for purchase or 
for refinancing. Following a method of 
Ambrose et al. (2004), the authors use 
three-stage least squares to estimate 
a logistic model relating the prob-
ability of receiving a loan designated 
as a higher-rate loan in the HMDA 
data to borrower, loan, economic, and 
geographic characteristics, allowing 
for endogeneity between the loan-to-
value, loan amount, and loan interest 
rate.  (Unlike the Elliehausen et al. 
paper discussed below, this paper does 
not account for potential simultaneity 
between the presence of a prepayment 
penalty and other loan terms.)  
Overall, the results of the analysis 
suggest that for many types of loans, 
African Americans and Latinos are 
more likely to receive a higher-priced 
loan compared to non-Latino white 
borrowers with similar characteristics. 
For example, the authors estimate that 
African Americans are 1.84 times 
and Latinos are 1.7 times more likely 
to receive a higher-rate fixed-rate 
purchase loan with prepayment penal-
ties, all else equal, than a non-Latino 
white borrower.  These estimates are 
statistically different from one at the 1 
percent and 5 percent levels, respec-
tively.  
It is beyond the scope of the paper 
to identify the causes for such a dispar-
ity in pricing. It could be that even 
the better measures of borrower risk 
that are used in the analysis still do 
not completely control for differences 
in risk.  However, the results suggest 
that other explanations must also be 
considered, for example, are minor-
ity borrowers steered to higher-priced 
loans?  The authors suggest some 
enhancements to the HMDA reports 
that would aid in further research, for 
example, including information on 
loan-to-value and credit scores, and 
also on the type of originator.
Alan White of Community Legal 
Services, Philadelphia, discussed the 
Rose and the Bocian et al. papers.  In 
his view, both papers provide further 
evidence on the harm to consumer 
welfare caused by deregulation of 
mortgage markets.  He thinks there 
has been little empirical work docu-
menting the welfare benefits of the   Business Review  Q1  2008   37 www.philadelphiafed.org
Previous research has indicated that loans 
with prepayment penalties have higher value 
to lenders, and the prepayment penalty 
mitigates some of the prepayment risk faced 
by the lender.
expansion of the subprime lending 
market.  Although their existence ap-
pears to be the received wisdom, he is 
skeptical that on balance such benefits 
outweigh the costs.  Indeed, he pro-
poses two alternative hypotheses: that 
subprime loans have displaced other 
credit products, like FHA loans, and 
that subprime lending has expanded 
credit not by bringing in more borrow-
ers, but by increasing the amount of 
funding available to individuals who 
had access to credit before the rise of 
the subprime market.  Regarding dis-
criminatory pricing, White suggested 
that researchers evaluate whether the 
loan-pricing matrices used by lenders 
to match risk factors with price are 
correctly calibrated. Do minority bor-
rowers pay higher prices because their 
cost to the lender is higher?  White 
also underscored one of the lessons 
from Rose: the subprime market is 
very heterogeneous — subprime loans 
that were made in 2000 are different 
from subprime loans that were made in 
2006, and loans made for purchase and 
loans made for refinance are different, 
with the latter often better thought of 
as a consumer credit product rather 
than as a mortgage. 
SESSION 2: ARE LEGISLATIVE 
REMEDIES TO LIMIT 
PREDATORY LENDING
REALLY REMEDIES? 
“The Effect of Prepayment 
Penalties on the Pricing of 
Subprime Mortgages,” by Gregory 
Elliehausen, Michael Staten, and 
Jevgenijs Steinbuks, also investigates 
prepayment penalties on subprime 
loans. Similar to Rose’s research, 
the results of this paper suggest that 
restricting certain loan characteristics, 
in particular prepayment penalties, 
may have unintended consequences. 
Previous research has indicated that 
loans with prepayment penalties 
have higher value to lenders, and the 
prepayment penalty mitigates some 
of the prepayment risk faced by the 
lender. However, studies have yielded 
conflicting results about whether the 
rates that borrowers pay are lower 
for loans that include prepayment 
penalties. Elliehausen et al. advance 
the existing literature by examining 
the relationship between prepayment 
penalties and loan rates using 
simultaneous equation estimation 
techniques, which recognize that 
prepayment penalty, loan rate, 
and loan-to-value ratios are set 
simultaneously by the lender. Previous 
studies have failed to recognize this 
endogeneity and so have potentially 
produced biased estimates of the effect 
of a prepayment penalty on the loan 
rate. 
This study uses the subprime 
mortgage database of the Financial 
Services Research Program, which 
contains data on all originations of 
the subprime subsidiaries of eight large 
financial institutions from 1995Q3 
to 2004Q4.  This database covers 
nearly one-quarter of loans reported 
as higher-priced mortgages made for 
purchase or refinancing of owner-occu-
pied homes in the 2004 HMDA data.  
The analysis includes close-ended first 
mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of 
90 percent or less.  The average loan 
amount for these loans in 2004 was 
$130,000. 
Because pricing schedules differ by 
loan type, the authors estimate sepa-
rate loan pricing models for fixed-rate, 
variable-rate, and hybrid mortgages 
with a 30-year term to maturity.   A 
three-equation simultaneous equation 
system is estimated, with loan rate pre-
mium (the difference between the loan 
rate and the rate on a Treasury secu-
rity of comparable maturity), loan-to-
value ratio, and presence of a prepay-
ment penalty as dependent variables.  
Loan-to-value and prepayment penalty 
are included as explanatory variables 
in the loan rate premium equation; 
loan rate premium is included as an 
explanatory variable in the loan-to-
value and in the prepayment penalty 
equation. Loan characteristics includ-
ed in the model as controls are loan 
amount, home value, loan-to-value, 
and whether the loan was a low-doc-
umentation loan. Borrower character-
istics included are borrower income, 
FICO risk score, and whether the 
home is owner-occupied.  The analysis 
also controls for whether the mortgage 
was originated by a mortgage broker 
and whether the loan was used for 
refinancing. Instruments are used to 
identify the system.  The prepayment 
penalty equation is a probit equation 
used to predict the probability that the 
loan includes a prepayment penalty.  
This predicted value is included in the 
loan rate premium equation and then 
the interest equation and loan-to-value 
equations are estimated by two-stage 
least squares.
The empirical results show that 
controlling for potential endogene-
ity is important: The single equation 38   Q1  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
The Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection 
Act (HOEPA), passed 
in 1994, is a federal 
law that regulates 
loans considered to 
be “high-cost loans.”
ordinary least squares results and the 
three-equation system results differ.  
Results for the three-equation system 
indicate that the presence of a prepay-
ment penalty is associated with lower 
loan rates: 38 basis points lower for 
fixed-rate loans, 13 basis points lower 
for variable-rate loans, and 19 basis 
points lower for hybrid loans.  The 
authors report that these interest rate 
reductions are similar to those found 
in lenders’ wholesale loan pricing rate 
sheets.  This result raises the possibility 
that a restriction on the use of prepay-
ment penalties may have the unintend-
ed consequence of raising loan rates.      
“State and Local Anti-Predatory 
Lending Laws: The Effect of Le-
gal Enforcement Mechanisms,” by 
Raphael Bostic, Kathleen Engel, 
Patricia McCoy, Anthony Penning-
ton-Cross, and Susan Wachter, takes 
another look at anti-predatory lend-
ing laws and their effect on subprime 
mortgage lending. On the one hand, 
such laws could restrict the availability 
of this credit and raise its price. On 
the other hand, they could allay con-
sumer concerns about predatory lend-
ing by raising the cost to lenders that 
engage in abusive practices, thereby 
increasing the demand for this credit. 
The authors’ analysis shows that in 
order to understand the effect of these 
laws, it is important to look at the indi-
vidual provisions, including the types 
of mortgages covered, restrictions on 
pricing, and enforcement mechanisms. 
The study finds that these components 
have independent effects on the supply 
of and demand for subprime mort-
gages. In particular, broader coverage, 
which was a provision in the newer 
anti-predation laws, and enhanced 
enforcement are associated with a 
greater likelihood of subprime origina-
tion, while restrictions on pricing are 
associated with a lower likelihood of 
subprime origination. 
The Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA), passed in 
1994, is a federal law that regulates 
loans considered to be “high-cost 
loans.”  The act defines these as first 
mortgages with an annual percentage 
rate at origination 8 percentage points 
or more above the yield on Treasury 
securities of comparable maturity; 
subordinate liens with a spread of 10 
percentage points or more; or loans 
with total points and fees that exceed 
the greater of 8 percent of the loan 
amount or $400 (subject to annual 
indexing).  While HOEPA imposes 
significant restrictions on the credit 
terms of these loans, it is estimated to 
cover only a small portion of subprime 
mortgages. Several states have passed 
their own laws; many of these lower 
the HOEPA pricing triggers, thereby 
expanding coverage. The laws differ 
in enforcement mechanisms: Some 
allow only government enforcement, 
and others allow borrowers to sue 
particular parties, with some restrict-
ing private lawsuits to compensatory 
damages only.
Bostic et al. examine the impact 
of anti-predatory lending laws on the 
three different outcomes: the prob-
ability of applying for a subprime loan 
relative to a prime loan, the probability 
of originating a subprime loan relative 
to a prime loan, and the probability of 
a subprime loan’s being rejected.  The 
analysis includes all types of anti-
predatory lending laws, both pre- and 
post-HOEPA, and finds an additional 
16 state laws that previous studies 
in the literature have not identified.  
Building on previous research (Ho and 
Pennington-Cross, 2006), the authors 
create two variants of a legal index 
that measures the breadth of coverage, 
type and severity of restrictions on 
loan terms, and enforcement mecha-
nisms.  Higher values of the index 
correspond to laws with broader cover-
age, more stringent restrictions, and 
stronger enforcement mechanisms.
The authors use 2004 and 2005 
HMDA data.  They identify subprime 
loans in two different ways. For 2004 
and 2005, they designate loans as sub-
prime if they are reported on HMDA 
as having an annual percentage rate 
in excess of the rate on a Treasury 
security of comparable maturity of 
3 percentage points or more. This 
information is available only on loan 
originations and not on applications 
for loans that were not originated.  For 
2004, they also had a list of subprime 
lenders that was generated by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) through indus-
try trade publications, HMDA data 
analysis, and phone calls to determine 
the extent of the institutions’ subprime 
lending.  Thus, for 2004 they were able 
to repeat their analysis for this defini-
tion of subprime, which also allowed 
them to investigate applications for 
subprime loans, as well as originations.
To focus on the effect of anti-
predatory lending laws on the market 
and to help control for other factors 
that might affect loan markets, the 
analysis includes only loans that were 
made in counties along a state border, 
where at least one of the states has 
an anti-predatory lending law. The 
authors then estimate three separate 
logit regressions to predict the three 
outcomes described above (the prob-
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or being rejected for a subprime loan 
relative to a prime loan), as a function 
of the legal index, a fixed effect desig-
nating the state border pair in which 
the loan is located, controls for bor-
rower characteristics, such as borrower 
income (but not borrower FICO score, 
which is not available in the HMDA 
data), and location characteristics such 
as county unemployment rate. They 
also include a control for whether the 
institution is regulated by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), since the OCC has interpreted 
the National Banking Act as exempt-
ing national banks from state and local 
anti-predatory lending laws.
The empirical results indicate 
that the existence of a state anti-
predatory lending law has little effect 
on credit flows in the subprime 
mortgage market: It has no effect on 
the odds of applying for or entering 
into a subprime loan, but it reduces the 
odds of being rejected for a subprime 
loan by 7 percent. However, the results 
also show that individual components 
of the laws can have significant and 
sometimes offsetting effects. Although 
the effects differ somewhat across year 
(2004 vs. 2005) and subprime loan 
definition (HUD list vs. HMDA price 
criteria), in general, the results suggest 
that tighter loan-term restrictions do 
not have a significant effect on the 
probability of a subprime loan applica-
tion’s being made but do increase the 
odds of a subprime loan application’s 
being rejected, and they reduce the 
odds of subprime loans’ being origi-
nated.  These effects are somewhat 
offset by provisions resulting in broader 
coverage of the laws. Broader cover-
age is associated with lower odds of 
subprime loan applications but also 
with lower odds of rejection and higher 
odds of origination.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that anti-predatory 
laws help reassure potential borrow-
ers, thereby attracting them to this 
market.  There is weak evidence that 
stronger enforcement is associated with 
higher probability of subprime origina-
tion and lower probability of rejection 
of a subprime application.  Similar to 
the Rose and Elliehausen et al. papers 
discussed above, one conclusion to 
be drawn from the paper is that the 
impact of laws intended to improve the 
functioning of the subprime mortgage 
market can be complex, resulting in 
unanticipated outcomes. 
Michael Calhoun of the Center 
for Responsible Lending discussed 
the Elliehausen et al. and Bostic et al. 
papers.  In Calhoun’s view, the mort-
gage delivery system is an important 
component of the subprime mortgage 
market, and he focused several of his 
comments on the research results con-
cerning mortgage brokers. One of the 
many findings in Elliehausen et al. is 
that loans from brokers are significant-
ly more likely to carry a prepayment 
penalty, all else equal, than loans from 
retail lenders. Calhoun pointed out 
that this is consistent with a hypoth-
esis discussed in Ernst (2005), namely, 
that brokers may be more likely to 
place borrowers in subprime loans 
with prepayment penalties in order to 
maximize their own compensation.  
Calhoun discussed three sources of 
compensation for brokers: They can be 
(but rarely are) paid in cash from the 
borrower, their fees can be financed 
into the loan amount, and they can 
receive a payment from the lender for 
placing a borrower with a higher inter-
est rate than the lender requires to 
compensate it for the given borrower’s 
risk profile.  The lender will be more 
likely to make such a payment if the 
loan includes a prepayment penalty, 
which helps to ensure that the bor-
rower remains in the loan long enough 
for the lender to recoup this payment.  
Calhoun calculates based on typical 
prepayment penalties that the interest 
rate reductions found for loans with 
prepayment penalties in Elliehausen 
et al. are not large enough to offset 
the cost of the prepayment penalty 
for many subprime borrowers with 
hybrid adjustable rate mortgages.  He 
also suggests that loans that are more 
profitable for the broker to deliver are 
not necessarily the best deal for the 
borrower.  Calhoun also suggested that 
it is important to consider the mort-
gage delivery system when assessing 
anti-predatory lending laws as in Bostic 
et al. In Calhoun’s view, the HOEPA 
triggers for high-cost loans may be too 
narrow, as they do not include prepay-
ment penalties or payments to brokers 
for delivering loans with rates above 
the lender’s minimal acceptable rate.  
Several states now include a broader 
definition of high-cost loans in their 
anti-predatory lending regulations.  
The luncheon speaker on the 
first day of the conference was Mary 
Lee Widener, president and CEO of 
Neighborhood Housing Services of 
America, Inc. (NHSA). In her presen-
tation, Widener said she expected the 
fallout from the current problems in 
the subprime market to be widespread 
but noted that credit markets have 
faced and handled large challenges in 
the past.  There are likely lessons to be 
learned from the current experience 
to help borrowers, lenders, commu-
nity development organizations, and 
policymakers handle future challenges.  
In Widener’s view the most important 
factors for advancing community de-
velopment financing are collaboration, 
affordability, and borrower support. 
Collaboration between community 
development organizations, regulators, 
policymakers, and lenders was essential 
for eliminating redlining, a com-
mon practice in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Development of fair lending practices 
followed, taking more collaboration. 
By the mid-1980s, the Community 
Reinvestment Act had resulted in 
hundreds of local partnerships between 40   Q1  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
lenders and nonprofits and local 
governments that delivered capital into 
many local communities.  Collabora-
tion with private-sector lenders was 
important for achieving affordability, 
and affordability included responsible 
underwriting so that borrowers could 
meet the long-term obligations of their 
mortgages. Borrower support was also 
needed — both pre-purchase and 
post-purchase counseling. In Widener’s 
view lenders’ commitment to forbear 
and not foreclose when temporary 
life events interrupted the borrower’s 
ability to repay loans was also an 
important element in helping families 
in low-income communities remain 
homeowners. Further advancements in 
the low-income mortgage market were 
made by NHSA through its collabora-
tion with the mortgage insurance in-
dustry, the secondary market through 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the 
rating agencies.  This allowed loans to 
low-income borrowers to be financed 
through the capital markets.  
Widener explained that several 
challenges remain. One is trying to 
overcome the reluctance of many 
communities to allow development of 
affordable housing. Another challenge 
is making the borrower support and 
development systems sustainable. One 
aid to doing this is showing that loans 
to low-income borrowers with proper 
support systems perform better than 
is commonly thought, which is what 
NHSA has experienced. The subprime 
lending market poses another chal-
lenge. When the terms under which 
subprime lending is available become 
predatory, such lending has a nega-
tive impact on communities. Better 
consumer education and development 
of alternative loan products better 
suited to lower-income borrowers can 
help. Widener discussed several such 
products that have been developed via 
collaborations among NHSA, other 
nonprofits, and the private sector. 
SESSION 3: WHAT DETER-
MINES WHO DEFAULTS OR 
GOES BANKRUPT AND HOW 
DO THEY FARE? 
“The Delinquency of Subprime 
Mortgages,” by Michelle Danis and 
Anthony Pennington-Cross, analyzes 
the dynamics of the payment behavior 
of subprime mortgage borrowers using 
more sophisticated econometric tech-
niques than have heretofore been used 
to study this issue.  Payment dynamics 
are an important determinant of loan 
pricing.  For example, delinquencies 
will increase the price of these loans 
to borrowers by increasing the cost of 
servicing these loans and of guarantee-
ing timely payments.  The paper’s goal 
is to identify the key factors that drive 
delinquency.
At any point in time a mortgage 
can be current, delinquent, or termi-
nated. Within each of these branches 
of possibilities, there are further alter-
natives (called nests). If delinquent, the 
mortgage can be 30, 60, 90, or more 
days late.  Termination can be due to 
either prepayment or default (that is, 
foreclosure). Notice that the status of 
the mortgage is the result of actions 
of both the borrower and the lender. 
To capture the multiplicity of possible 
outcomes, the authors estimate (via 
full-information maximum likelihood) 
a nested logit model of loan outcomes 
as a function of explanatory variables, 
including loan characteristics (age of 
loan, loan-to-value, whether the loan 
is a low-documentation loan, whether 
the loan is a no-documentation 
loan, and whether the loan includes 
a prepayment penalty), borrower’s 
FICO score at time of origination, 
and variables controlling for economic 
conditions in the state in which the 
property is located (change in house 
prices, volatility in house prices, 
unemployment rate, and mortgage rate 
change (which does not vary by state)).  
The nested logit model has an advan-
tage over multinomial logit, which is 
often used to investigate such multi-
choice situations.  The multinomial 
logit model requires that the ratio of 
the probabilities of any two alternative 
choices (that is, the odds ratio between 
the two alternatives) be independent 
of any other alternative.  This makes 
estimation easier but is often not a 
good description of behavior.  For 
example, the multinomial logit model 
would imply that if prepayment were 
taken away as an option, we’d see 
proportionate changes in the prob-
abilities of all other alternatives.  But 
the nested logit model would imply 
that any change in the probabilities of 
delinquency is evenly distributed over 
30, 60, or 90+ days, but there would 
not need to be proportionate increases 
in the probabilities of the remaining 
alternatives in the other nests (that is, 
default and current).  Thus, the nested 
logit model is less restrictive, and the 
authors present tests indicating that 
the more restrictive multinomial logit 
model is rejected for their data. 
The authors’ loan data are from 
LoanPerformance, which provides data 
on pools of nonagency, publicly placed 
securitized loans.  They use monthly 
data on the payment status of single-
family 30-year fixed-rate subprime 
mortgages on owner-occupied property 
originated between January 1996 and 
May 2003.  Over 97,000 loans are 
included in the analysis.  State-level 
data on house price level, house price 
volatility, and the unemployment rate, 
and national prime mortgage rates are 
matched to the loan data.  However, 
the time period is too early to cover 
the recent period of sharp increases 
in subprime mortgage delinquencies. 
The authors present estimates of the 
change in the probability of the out-
come associated with a one-standard-
deviation increase and one-standard-
deviation decrease in an explanatory 
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probability of prepayment increasing 
as mortgage rates decline. But the 
probability of prepayment is fairly un-
responsive to changes in house prices, 
which is an unexpected result.
An interesting finding is that 
factors that imply increased probabil-
ity of delinquency do not necessarily 
imply increased probability of default. 
For example, higher loan-to-value at 
origination implies a higher probabil-
ity of delinquency but not of default.  
This is a reminder that movement 
from delinquency to default is partly 
determined by actions of the lender. 
Another surprise is that higher state 
unemployment rates do not seem to 
trigger higher probability of delinquen-
cy or default in the authors’ data.  The 
interaction between local economic 
conditions and loan performance 
presents an interesting avenue for 
future research and is one of the issues 
addressed in the Grover et al. paper 
discussed below.
“The Anatomy of U.S. Personal 
Bankruptcy Under Chapter 13,” 
by Hülya Eraslan, Wenli Li, and 
Pierre-Daniel Sarte, analyzes the 
performance of consumers who file for 
personal bankruptcy under Chapter 
13, one of two chapters of the U.S. 
bankruptcy code under which house-
holds can file for bankruptcy.  Under 
constant at their means. (The changes 
are not symmetric for increases and de-
creases in explanatory variables.) They 
are unable to report standard errors 
for these elasticity estimates, which 
are highly nonlinear functions of the 
explanatory variables and coefficients. 
However, most of the coefficient esti-
mates are significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent or better level.
The empirical results show that 
some of the relationships between the 
explanatory variables and the probabil-
ity of delinquency, default, and prepay-
ment are as expected but others are 
not.  A borrower’s credit score appears 
to be a robust predictor of default and 
delinquency, with higher credit scores 
associated with lower likelihood of 
delinquency or default.  The estimated 
probability of 90-day or more delin-
quency is 0.75 percent for a borrower 
with a FICO score at the mean 649; 
it is 1.89 percent for a borrower with 
a FICO score one standard deviation 
lower, at 579. 
The empirical results also show 
that for borrowers with credit scores 
below 630, higher credit scores are 
associated with higher likelihood of 
prepayment.  This might reflect the 
borrowers’ ability to migrate to prime 
loans as their credit scores improve. 
However, for scores above 630, an in-
crease in credit score is associated with 
a lower probability of prepayment. This 
seems counterintuitive. The authors 
suggest this might reflect something 
unique about these borrowers that is 
not controlled for in the estimation – 
these borrowers seem to have credit 
scores that would qualify them for 
prime mortgages, yet they have taken 
out subprime mortgages.  
Prepayments on mortgages are 
known to be difficult to predict, and 
the paper’s results do not contradict 
this. As expected, the probability 
of prepayment is very responsive to 
changes in interest rates, with the 
Chapter 7, filers turn over all of their 
assets above an exemption level that 
varies by state in exchange for having 
their debts discharged.  Under Chapter 
13, filers need not turn over their as-
sets but must complete a plan that in-
dicates how they will repay their debts 
out of future income.  The repayment 
plan under Chapter 13 must propose to 
pay at least as much as the value of the 
assets creditors would have received 
under Chapter 7.  
The Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act, 
enacted in 2005, introduced a means 
tests on filers, whereby filers deemed 
to have sufficient income would be 
required to file under Chapter 13.  The 
act presumes that higher-income filers 
will end up paying off more of their 
debt under Chapter 13, while at the 
same time receiving a fresh start.  But 
there is little, if any, empirical evidence 
about how debtors and their creditors 
actually fare under Chapter 13.  This 
paper provides such evidence using a 
data set that the authors painstakingly 
constructed from public court docket 
records of all Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
filings between 2001 and 2002 in 
Delaware.  The analysis, based on data 
from over 900 filings, casts doubt on 
the success of Chapter 13 filings.  
The authors approach their 
investigation by constructing a 
theoretical model of the bankruptcy 
decision.  Debtors, when considering 
bankruptcy, decide first whether to file 
under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.  The 
authors do not model this decision and 
focus only on the decisions filers make 
after they have chosen Chapter 13.  
These Chapter 13 filers must decide 
on the length of the repayment plan to 
propose (typically three years or five 
years).  Once the plan is proposed, the 
court-appointed trustee must decide 
whether to recommend that the court 
confirm the plan or dismiss it. If the 
plan is dismissed, the creditors can re-
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sume debt collection measured against 
the filer. If the plan is confirmed, the 
filer begins making payments accord-
ing to the plan.  Over time, the debtor 
may experience unexpected changes in 
income and the plan can be modified.  
If the debtor completes the (perhaps 
modified) plan, any remaining debts 
are discharged.  If for some reason the 
debtor cannot or will not complete 
the payments according to plan, the 
case is dismissed. The debtor might 
try to convert the case to Chapter 7 
or go back to face his or her creditors 
without the protection of the bank-
ruptcy provisions.  The authors use 
maximum likelihood techniques to 
estimate their structural model relating 
several outcomes — the choice of plan 
length, whether the plan is confirmed 
or dismissed, the creditor recovery rate 
under the plan, and whether the plan 
is brought to conclusion — to exog-
enous debtor characteristics.
 The Chapter 13 filers in the 
sample have significantly more debt 
but fewer assets than nonfilers — filers’ 
median total debt is about $121,000, 
about 6.6 times the national median, 
while the median value of their total 
assets is about $103,000, less than half 
the national median.  The filers are 
somewhat less likely to be unemployed 
than the average Delaware resident, 
but their average monthly income is 
about 30 percent less than Delaware’s 
average adjusted gross income and 
they experienced a significant decline 
in income prior to filing.  The median 
credit recovery rate under Chapter 
13 is quite low, about 12 percent of 
total debt; the mean recovery rate is 
about 28 percent; and a relatively small 
fraction of Chapter 13 filers are actu-
ally successful in getting their cases 
discharged.  Moreover, 20 percent of 
the debtors who want to file under 
Chapter 13 are never successful in get-
ting their repayment plan approved by 
the bankruptcy court – and this was at 
a time when these filers were volun-
tarily choosing to file under Chapter 
13 instead of Chapter 7.  
The authors’ estimation results 
indicate that the amount that creditors 
ultimately recover from borrowers that 
file for Chapter 13 is significantly re-
lated to whether debtors are experienc-
ing bankruptcy for the first time, the 
amount of their past-due secured debt 
at the time of filing, and the amount 
of income they have in excess of what 
is required for basic maintenance. 
Also, changes in the debtors’ financial 
conditions while in bankruptcy affect 
their outcomes under Chapter 13.  The 
authors perform some policy experi-
ments using their estimated model. 
One of the provisions of the new law 
prohibits debtors with income above 
the state median to file a plan with less 
than five years’ duration. Their model 
suggests that this provision will likely 
result in only a minimal increase in re-
covery rates for creditors but may lower 
the likelihood that filers emerge from 
the bankruptcy process with a fresh 
start and their cases discharged. 
Katherine Porter of the Universi-
ty of Iowa College of Law discussed the 
Danis and Pennington-Cross and the 
Eraslan et al. papers.  Two key ques-
tions important to these papers are: 
How do we define success in lending 
markets, and what enables this suc-
cess?  As Porter pointed out, the defi-
nition of success will likely differ for 
creditors and for debtors. From a policy 
perspective, one must decide what a 
tolerable level of failure is and then 
determine how one might respond to 
failure, be it via bankruptcy relief, gov-
ernment or private aid, or restrictions 
on the availability of credit. 
Porter suggested that it is not 
altogether obvious how policymakers 
should treat certain trigger events. 
For example, who should bear the 
responsibility for medical problems or 
job problems that might trigger bank-
ruptcy? In most cases, family income 
plays a primary role in determining the 
success of any type of remedy. But both 
the level and the stability of income 
have been shown to be important to 
successful outcomes under Chapter 
7 in previous research and under 
Chapter 13 in the Eraslan, et al. paper. 
Porter suggested that further investiga-
tion into the effect of income stability 
on outcomes might prove to be fruitful 
in furthering our understanding of the 
bankruptcy process.
SESSION 4: WHAT SHOULD 
AND CAN BE DONE TO 
ENHANCE BORROWERS’ 
KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR 
CREDIT RISK? 
“Targeting Foreclosure Inter-
ventions: An Analysis of Neighbor-
hood Characteristics Associated 
with High Foreclosure Rates in Two 
Minnesota Counties,” by Michael 
Grover, Laura Smith, and Richard 
Todd, examines the predictability of 
outcome – in this case, the probability 
that a mortgage moves into foreclosure 
– based on neighborhood characteris-
tics. If one can predict which neighbor-
hoods are likely to have a high rate 
of foreclosure, programs designed to 
help sustain homeownership could be 
targeted to neighborhoods with the 
greatest need.    
The paper uses public data on 
foreclosures in two counties in Minne-
sota, Hennepin and Ramsey, in 2002.  
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(Minneapolis is located in Hennepin 
and St. Paul is located in Ramsey.)  
Data on 1,178 foreclosed properties 
were used in the analysis. Street ad-
dresses of the properties involved were 
matched to their census tract, so that 
Census Bureau data from 1990 and 
2000 could be matched to the foreclo-
sure data.  Additional data on lender, 
interest rates, and mortgage riders and 
conditions were obtained from the 
property-records departments of the 
two counties. Census-tract level credit 
score data were obtained from PCI 
Corporation and CRA Whiz; HMDA 
data were also used. The authors found 
that it was very difficult to determine 
from the mortgage documents whether 
the loan was for home purchase or 
for refinancing, and it was sometimes 
difficult to determine the lender. The 
painstaking nature of the data collec-
tion limited the analysis to one year 
and two counties. In the authors’ data 
set, foreclosed mortgages are dispro-
portionately of recent origin, with a 
median duration from origination to 
foreclosure sale of 2.6 years. Com-
pared to other mortgages originated 
in the same neighborhood during the 
same period, the foreclosed mortgages 
tended to have higher interest rates 
and smaller loan amounts and were 
more likely to have been originated 
by a nonbank or subprime lender and 
to have had another mortgage on the 
property.  Reflecting strong house 
price appreciation in the time period 
studied, the data also show that the 
sheriff’s sale typically brought in more 
than the outstanding mortgage bal-
ance.  Thus, had borrowers chosen to 
sell their homes before defaulting, they 
could have paid off their mortgages 
and gotten some equity.  It remains an 
interesting research question as to why 
borrowers did not do this.
The authors’ analysis indicates 
that of seven variables available in 
advance of foreclosure, neighborhood 
credit score is singly the most accurate 
in identifying census tracts with the 
highest foreclosure rates, which is con-
sistent with the Danis and Penning-
ton-Cross findings, discussed above.  
In particular, the 1999 neighborhood 
credit score correctly ranks 36 of the 
50 tracts with the highest foreclosure 
rates and its correlation with the 
foreclosure rate is 0.64.  The authors 
also perform a multivariate analysis of 
the association of foreclosure rate with 
variables available in advance of or 
concurrently with foreclosure.  They 
estimate a logit model that predicts 
the probability of foreclosure with 
census-level variables measuring credit 
risk, minority homeownership transi-
tion, and other demographic factors.  
Because foreclosure is a relatively rare 
event, to accurately predict the prob-
ability of foreclosure, one needs a large 
number of mortgaged units.  Since 
the number of mortgaged units varies 
considerably over the census tracts in 
the sample, the variance of prediction 
error might vary systematically with 
the number of mortgaged units in the 
census tract.  To allow for this po-
tential heteroscedasticity in the error 
term, the authors estimate the logit 
regression using the minimum chi-
squared estimator.
This multivariate analysis 
indicates that the percentage of 
neighborhood adults with very low 
credit scores and the change in 
the share of minority homeowners 
between 1990 and 2000 (a measure 
of neighborhood transition) are the 
strongest predictors of foreclosure 
rate; both are positively associated 
with foreclosure rate.  Based on their 
findings, the authors suggest that there 
may be social benefits from making 
mortgage and foreclosure records and 
credit scores by neighborhood more 
readily available to the public and 
foreclosure mitigation practitioners, 
but a cost-benefit analysis of this 
suggestion is beyond the scope of the 
paper.
Several papers in this volume 
have found that a borrower’s credit risk 
score at origination is associated with 
mortgage outcome, with lower scores 
associated with higher rates of delin-
quency and default.  An interesting 
question is whether borrowers have an 
accurate assessment of their own credit 
score and whether the accuracy of 
their assessment varies with the level 
of their score. If higher risk borrowers 
have less accurate perceptions of their 
own credit risk, they may be more 
likely to enter into loan contracts for 
which they are not well suited (if such 
contracts are offered to them), and this 
could partly explain the higher rates of 
foreclosure and delinquencies seen for 
these borrowers.  
“Consumer Credit Literacy: 
What Price Perception?” by Marsha 
Courchane, Adam Gailey, and Peter 
Zorn, tackles this interesting question.  
The authors use data provided to them 
by prime and subprime lenders on 1.2 
million mortgage loans originated in 
2004 and from a consumer survey con-
ducted in 2000 by Freddie Mac.  The 
loan data include variables collected 
under HMDA and loan-level variables 
used in underwriting and pricing the 
loans, such as FICO score, loan-to-
value ratio, and debt-to-income ratio.  
The survey includes information about 
consumers’ financial knowledge and 
credit outcomes such as whether they 
have been denied credit, been evicted, 
had utilities turned off, or property 
repossessed.  The survey also asked 
respondents how they would rate their 
current credit record. 
The empirical results suggest 
that inaccurate self-assessment is not 
always associated with bad financial 
outcomes (which might include higher 
likelihood of being denied credit, being 
evicted, or declaring bankruptcy) and 
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matters.  The authors use locally 
weighted polynomial regressions to 
examine the relationship between the 
percent of respondents experiencing a 
bad financial outcome and credit-risk 
score as measured by FICO score, with 
separate analyses for respondents that 
correctly assessed their credit score 
and for those who did not.  They also 
use probit regressions to investigate 
this relationship when controlling for 
other factors, including income and 
net worth.  Both analyses indicate that 
consumers who assess their credit score 
to be lower than it actually is (that 
is, are pessimistic about their credit 
record) are more likely to experience a 
bad financial outcome than those who 
accurately assess their credit score, but 
consumers who assess their credit score 
to be higher than it actually is (that is, 
are optimistic) are less likely to have 
bad financial outcomes than those 
who correctly assess their score. 
One possible explanation is that 
there is reverse causality in the survey 
data.  That is, a bad financial outcome 
might have caused the accuracy of the 
self-assessment of credit score rather 
than the other way around.  However, 
in a separate analysis that helps to 
address this potential reverse causal-
ity, the authors still find that optimism 
is associated with better financial 
outcomes.  The authors next explore 
an alternative explanation — that 
consumers are actually more accurate 
in their assessments of their credit risk 
than their FICO scores reflect.  Using 
their loan and survey data, the authors 
construct an alternative credit score 
and find some support for this alterna-
tive hypothesis: a regression of this 
alternative credit score on FICO score 
and accuracy of self-assessment (that 
is, optimism and pessimism) indicates 
that holding FICO score constant, op-
timism is associated with higher values 
of the alternative credit score (that is, 
lower risk) and pessimism is associated 
with lower values of the alternative 
credit score (that is, higher risk).
The authors interpret the results 
of their research as supporting the 
value of financial literacy programs to 
the extent that these programs help 
educate consumers about not only 
their credit scores but also a broader 
set of factors that are important for 
assessing their credit risk.  An alterna-
tive interpretation, which differs from 
the authors’, is that consumers do not 
need (or no longer need) these pro-
grams, as they appear to be accurate in 
assessing their credit risk.
In his discussion, Glenn Canner 
of the Federal Reserve Board staff 
noted that concerns about foreclo-
sures have increased over time as the 
credit-quality of the borrower pool has 
widened, new types of mortgages have 
emerged, short-term interest rates have 
risen, and house prices have flattened 
or begun to fall.  He agreed that it was 
important to try to identify leading 
indicators of neighborhood foreclosure 
sales, given the adverse effects foreclo-
sures can have on individuals and their 
neighborhoods.  
Canner discussed two theories 
of default.  The trigger-events theory 
suggests that borrowers may default 
when certain life-events – for example, 
medical problems, divorce, job loss – 
disrupt their ability or willingness to 
pay.  The options theory suggests that 
when a borrower takes out a mortgage 
it is like having a put option on the 
value of the home – the borrower will 
choose to default when the mortgage 
balance exceeds the value of his or her 
home.  These two theories can suggest 
alternative factors that Grover et al. 
may want to incorporate into their 
study of predicting foreclosures. The 
options theory suggests that areas with 
falling home prices or where borrow-
ers have little or negative equity might 
show higher rates of foreclosure. The 
trigger-event theory suggests that fac-
tors that disrupt income flows or lead 
to unexpected expenses might lead 
to foreclosure.  A trigger event might 
also be a factor that could affect the 
accuracy of a borrower’s assessment 
of his or her own credit risk.  Canner 
discussed other factors that could af-
fect self-assessment accuracy, including 
expectations about one’s job prospects 
and future income, financial literacy, 
experience in obtaining credit, the rea-
son a payment was missed (a one-time 
event or a more habitual problem), and 
changes in one’s credit score over time.
Charles Plosser, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
opened the second day of the confer-
ence by discussing the theme that 
brought together the diverse group of 
individuals, including government poli-
cymakers, academic researchers, com-
munity leaders, consumer advocates, 
and financial service providers.  The 
theme he discussed was that to ensure 
opportunity for the economically 
distressed and to promote economic 
development, we must be guided by 
accurate information, careful research, 
and sound policy analysis.
In Plosser’s view, “public policy 
driven by headlines rarely turns out 
to be good policy” and research can 
now make a greater contribution to 
economic development efforts than 
it could in the past because develop-
ment efforts have been more diverse 
and more local in nature.  The efficacy 
of these various programs cannot be 
discerned without the proper research.  
Plosser discussed the importance of 
development strategies that work with 
the marketplace as it tries to be more 
responsive to the needs of lower-in-
come households and cautions against 
the law of unintended consequences 
that might arise if policymakers try to 
manipulate economic outcomes.  Poli-
cies are likely to always have some sur-
prising effects, but careful analysis of 
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To ensure opportunity for the economically 
distressed and to promote economic 
development, we must be guided by accurate 
information, careful research, and sound
policy analysis.
ing of implemented policies can help 
keep such surprises to a minimum.
SESSION 5: DOES THE FINANC-
ING OF SMALL BUSINESSES 
DIFFER FOR MINORITY-
OWNED BUSINESSES AND FOR 
BUSINESSES IN LOW-INCOME 
AREAS?
The last two sessions of the 
conference turned from mortgages to 
other aspects of community lending 
and development.  “Tracing Access 
to Financial Capital Among African-
Americans from the Entrepreneurial 
Venture to the Established Busi-
ness,” by Alicia Robb and Robert 
Fairlie, empirically investigates the 
relationship between wealth, access 
to financial capital, and the outcomes 
from African American-owned busi-
nesses from the start-up stage through 
maturity.  Business ownership rates for 
African Americans are considerably 
lower than those for whites.  Accord-
ing to the 2000 census data, nearly 11 
percent of white workers are self-
employed business owners, while less 
than 5 percent of African-American 
workers are.  In addition, African 
American-owned businesses appear 
to be less successful on average than 
those owned by whites or Asians, with 
lower profits and higher closure rates.  
Understanding the sources of such 
disparities is an important step toward 
determining whether entrepreneurship 
is an effective way out of poverty for 
minorities.  The research can also help 
in determining whether government 
programs offering loans to minority-
owned businesses can be made more 
effective or whether a new approach is 
needed.  While previous studies have 
found that the poorer performance of 
African American-owned businesses 
relative to white-owned businesses 
stems from low levels of start-up capi-
tal, education, and business experi-
ence, these studies did not trace out 
the relationship between wealth and 
access to financial capital over the life 
of the business. 
The authors use data from several 
sources, including the Census Bureau’s 
Characteristics of Business Owners 
Survey, the 1998 Survey of Small Busi-
ness Finances, the Survey of Minority-
Owned Businesses, the Survey of 
Business Owners, and the Current 
Population Survey, with sample-size 
varying over the surveys and years.  
For example, the 1998 Survey of Small 
Business Finances includes about 
3500 businesses that were not equally 
owned by a minority and nonminority; 
the 1997 Survey of Minority-Owned 
Business Enterprises includes over 15 
million white-owned firms and over 
750,000 African American-owned 
firms. All the data sets confirm that 
African American-owned businesses 
underperform white-owned businesses 
and tend to be smaller in terms of sales 
and employment.  
Research on entrepreneurship 
indicates that personal wealth is an 
important determinant of self-employ-
ment.  The differences in net worth 
between whites and African Ameri-
cans are large: The median net worth 
of whites, at $67,000, is more than 10 
times the median net worth of African 
Americans, at under $6,200.  Results 
using the Current Population Survey 
data from 1998 to 2003 indicate that 
the largest single factor explaining 
racial disparities in business creation 
rates are differences in asset levels of 
the owners prior to self-employment 
– the authors find that lower levels 
of assets among African Americans 
account for 15.5 percent of the differ-
ence in the probability of becoming 
self-employed between whites and 
African Americans. However, a related 
question is whether African Ameri-
cans are less able to raise external 
funds to start their businesses than 
are whites and are thereby hampered 
by undercapitalized businesses to 
start with.  The authors provide some 
evidence consistent with this: The 
Characteristics of Business Owner data 
indicate that African American-owned 
businesses have lower levels of start-up 
capital compared to white-owned busi-
nesses.  Less than 2 percent of African 
American-owned businesses start with 
$100,000 or more in capital, compared 
with nearly 5 percent of white-owned 
businesses, and 6.5 percent of African 
American-owned businesses start 
with $25,000 to $100,000 in capital, 
compared with about 11 percent of 
white-owned businesses.  The empiri-
cal results also show that lower start-up 
capital accounts for 14.5 percent of the 
difference in profitability of white-
owned and African American-owned 
businesses.  However, as the authors 
discuss, the amount of start-up capital 
available for investment in new busi-
nesses may be related to the predicted 
performance of the business.  That is, 
it could be that African American-
owned businesses have lower start-up 
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their probability of success is lower.  Or 
they could have less access to capital 
because they have less personal wealth 
to borrow against.
The authors show that some 
differences in racial borrowing pat-
terns persist even as the businesses 
mature.  Data from the Survey of 
Small Business Finances indicate that 
African American-owned businesses 
are less likely to have an outstand-
ing loan or credit line and more likely 
to have borrowed on a credit card 
than white-owned businesses, but the 
African American-owned firms also 
have worse credit histories than white-
owned businesses, including higher 
rates of delinquency and bankruptcy.  
The authors estimated a multivariate 
logistic equation and found that once 
credit history is controlled for, the dif-
ference in the probability of having an 
outstanding loan is not statistically sig-
nificant.  However, African American 
owners are more likely to have been 
denied credit and to have borrowed on 
their credit card than white owners, 
even controlling for credit history.  
The causes of the differences in credit 
experiences of white and African 
American business owners, the effects 
these differences might have on busi-
ness outcomes, and the direction of 
causality (does limited access to credit 
cause poor performance or does poor 
performance lead to limited access to 
credit?) are potentially fruitful avenues 
to pursue in future research.
Indeed, “Commercial Lending 
Distance and Historically Under-
served Areas,” by Robert DeYoung, 
Scott Frame, Dennis Glennon, 
Daniel McMillen, and Peter Nigro, 
addresses the topic of access to credit 
by small businesses located in minor-
ity and low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods, which have typically 
been underserved by financial ser-
vices. There is generally little publicly 
available information about small 
businesses with which to assess their 
creditworthiness. The inability to 
distinguish low-credit-risk small firms 
from high-credit-risk small firms can 
result in the rationing of credit to all 
small firms. Banks, in particular local 
banks, can help eliminate some of 
these information problems through 
repeated interactions with the firm. To 
the extent that minority and low- to 
moderate-income neighborhoods have 
less access to local financial services, 
they are potentially put at an even 
greater disadvantage at overcoming 
the imperfect information problems 
and gaining access to credit.  However, 
the advent of new technologies, such 
as credit scoring models for small busi-
nesses, can help alleviate the problem 
of lack of proximate financial services 
by giving lenders not necessarily physi-
cally located in the local neighborhood 
the ability to distinguish more cred-
itworthy firms from less creditworthy 
firms.  These new technologies can 
substitute for the local bank-borrower 
relationship in alleviating imperfect 
information impediments to lend-
ing.  Indeed, several previous studies 
have found an increase in the distance 
between U.S. small business borrowers 
and their bank lenders in recent years. 
The authors extend the previ-
ous literature by examining changes 
in borrower-bank lender distance 
for low- and moderate-income areas 
and predominately (that is, over 50 
percent) minority areas.  Their data 
are a random sample of over 27,000 
small business loans originated by 
U.S. commercial banks under the U.S. 
Small Business Administration loan 
program from January 1984 to April 
2001 with term-to-maturity of three, 
seven, and 15 years.  The data include 
locations for both borrower and lender, 
so the authors computed as-the-crow-
flies distances for each pair. They then 
used mapping software to determine 
whether the borrower was located in 
a low- and moderate- vs. middle- and 
high-income census tract or a pre-
dominantly minority vs. nonminority 
census tract.  
The univariate analysis looks 
at borrower-lender distance by type 
of census tract over time.  Their 
multivariate ordinary least squares 
regression analysis (which includes 
loans originated in the period January 
1992-April 2001) relates distance to 
indicators of whether the borrower is 
located in a low- and moderate-income 
area, whether the borrower is located 
in a minority area, a linear time trend, 
interactions between type of census 
tract and the time trend, and a set 
of variables to control for borrower, 
lender, and loan characteristics at the 
time of loan origination.
The analyses indicate that dur-
ing the 1980s and most of the 1990s, 
borrower-lender distances tended to 
be stable and shorter, on average, for 
small businesses in low and moderate-
income areas and in predominately 
minority areas than for those in 
middle- and upper-income areas and 
nonminority areas, respectively. By 
the late 1990s, however, all borrower-
lender distances had increased, but 
those for small businesses in low- and 
moderate-income areas and in predom-
inately minority areas had increased 
more, so that the borrower-lender dis-
tances are now longer for firms located 
in these areas compared to firms in 
middle- and upper-income areas and 
nonminority areas, respectively. The 
timing is consistent with the introduc-
tion of automated small-business credit 
scoring models, and smaller loans 
in the sample (to which these credit 
scoring models are most often applied) 
seem to be driving the results. While 
these results are suggestive, the authors 
cannot directly test the hypothesis 
that the introduction of small-business 
credit scoring models has allowed for 
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and lender. A definitive test is an 
interesting topic for future research.
In discussing the DeYoung et al. 
paper, Leora Klapper of the World 
Bank said that two types of credit 
scoring models are currently being 
used for small-business lending.  The 
most common produces the personal 
credit score of the business owner, 
which measures the probability that 
the owner will default and is based 
on data on the owner, including the 
owner’s credit history and indebted-
ness.  The other model, which is 
growing in usage, produces a business 
survival score, which measures the 
probability of business failure and is 
based on data on the business or busi-
ness’s industry, including information 
on management quality and industry 
risk.  A business survival score can be 
derived when owners don’t have much 
personal credit history, and such mod-
els are becoming increasingly used in 
emerging markets like India that don’t 
have credit bureaus collecting data on 
personal credit histories.
Klapper suggested that more re-
search needs to be done to determine 
whether the credit scoring models are 
actually increasing access to credit in 
low-income neighborhoods. Can these 
models substitute for bank branches in 
delivering credit to the smallest busi-
nesses?  As the financial system moves 
to more quantitative underwriting 
models, are owners with limited credit 
histories able to obtain as much credit 
as they did under more qualitative 
relationship lending by a loan officer? 
As Klapper pointed out, access 
to credit by African American busi-
ness owners was a main theme in the 
paper by Robb and Fairlie.  There is a 
growing international literature that 
links access to financial services and 
entrepreneurship. Aggregate level data 
show a relationship between economic 
growth and access to capital. Klap-
per showed that based on data on 90 
countries, there is a strong significant 
positive relationship between the ratio 
of aggregate private credit to GDP (a 
measure of financial development) and 
entry rates of new businesses. However, 
empirically it is difficult to separate 
out the effects of personal wealth and 
credit history from access to capital to 
determine their independent effects. 
Klapper cited some previous literature 
that looked at the effect of windfall 
gains on entrepreneurship as a way of 
isolating the effect of access to capital 
on the self-employment decision. For 
example, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) 
found that winners of the Swedish lot-
tery are more likely to enter self-em-
ployment and remain successfully self-
employed, controlling for other factors 
like demographics and inheritances.  
This evidence is consistent with access 
to credit being an important determi-
nant of entrepreneurship. 
Klapper suggested that as credit 
scoring becomes more important in 
the delivery of financial services and 
credit to small businesses, helping 
those in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods to understand their 
credit scores and learn ways to improve 
them will likely become more impor-
tant in expanding their economic 
opportunities.
SESSION 6: CAN ALTERNATIVE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
PRODUCTS HELP THE 
UNDERBANKED?  
The theme of access to financial 
services was also taken up in the last 
session, which focused on two particu-
lar products: payday lending and pre-
paid cards. As discussed in “Strategic 
Pricing of Payday Loans: Evidence 
from Colorado, 2000-2005,” by Rob-
ert DeYoung and Ronnie Phillips, 
payday lending has arguably extended 
credit availability to more households, 
but at what price?  In a typical payday 
lending transaction, a customer 
receives a specified amount of cash in 
return for a personal check written to 
the lender for that amount plus a fee; 
the lender holds this check for a speci-
fied short period, often two weeks or 
less.  At the end of the holding period, 
the transaction can be terminated by 
the lender’s depositing the check or 
the customer can pay another fee to 
roll over the loan.  Critics of payday 
lending say it is credit offered at exorbi-
tant prices — triple-digit APRs are 
not uncommon — and marketed to 
unsophisticated borrowers.  Others say 
such lending fills a need for immediate, 
short-term credit.  Why borrowers use 
payday loans rather than alternative 
forms of credit is not fully understood.  
Surveys show, for example, that the 
typical payday loan customer has a job 
and a bank account, and half have a 
credit card.  
The paper investigates the pricing 
patterns of payday lenders in Colo-
rado and concludes that these lenders 
behave strategically when setting their 
terms and fees.  The authors’ analysis 
is based on information on nearly 
25,000 payday loans made in Colorado 
between June 2000 and August 2005.  
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These loans were made after legislation 
was passed that limited loan principal 
to $500 for a term of 40 days or less, 
limited the finance charge to a maxi-
mum of 20 percent of loan principal 
up to $300 and to 7.5 percent above 
$300, and permitted only one renewal 
of the loan. The average APR on the 
loans is nearly 460 percent, and nearly 
90 percent of the loans carried the 
maximum charge allowed by Colorado 
law.  Because payday loan prices are 
constrained by the law, the authors 
use Tobit regressions to investigate the 
relationship between pricing, competi-
tion in the market, and demographic 
characteristics of the geographic mar-
ket (ZIP code area) in which the loans 
are made. Since payday lenders appear 
in less than a quarter of the ZIP code 
areas in Colorado and this locational 
choice of the lenders might be related 
to the factors included in the Tobit 
regression (for example, the income in 
the market), there is a potential sample 
selection bias; that is, the sample may 
not be randomly selected.  The authors 
correct for this using the standard two-
stage Heckman procedure.
The analysis indicates that over 
time, payday loan prices in Colorado 
have drifted to the state-legislated 
price ceiling, and that this occurred 
more quickly in markets with more 
payday lenders where explicit collusion 
was more difficult.  Thus, the legislated 
price ceiling seems to have behaved 
as a focal point and may have had an 
unintended effect of facilitating im-
plicit collusion.  The authors’ empirical 
results also suggest that lenders take 
advantage of borrower switching costs 
by offering lower prices on initial loans 
than on refinanced loans (although 
the difference is small).  Lenders that 
face fewer competitors appear better 
able to exploit relationships in this 
way; that is, they charged an even 
lower initial price than did lenders 
facing more competition.  This inter-
temporal pricing strategy might be less 
profitable for lenders in more competi-
tive markets, since they face a higher 
probability of losing their customers to 
competitors before being able to make 
up for the low initial price.  Perhaps 
more surprisingly, the authors also find 
that payday loan prices are higher in 
markets with more commercial bank 
branches.  This suggests that commer-
cial bank products are not a substi-
tute for payday loans.  Indeed, to the 
extent that borrowers need a checking 
account to take out a payday loan, 
commercial banking services serve as a 
complement to payday lending.
While payday loans offer an alter-
native to other forms of credit, prepaid 
cards offer an alternative to other 
forms of payment.  “Cardholder Use 
of General Spending Prepaid Cards: 
A Closer Look at the Market,” by 
Sherry Rhine, Katy Jacob, Yazmin 
Osaki, and Jennifer Tescher, studies 
the current and potential use of this 
rapidly growing payment instrument.  
Traditional gift cards are typically 
used to make small-dollar transactions 
with specific retailers.  In contrast, 
general spending prepaid cards can 
hold considerable value and can be 
used to make payments at a variety of 
establishments.  For example, a firm 
may offer payroll cards to its employ-
ees through which the firm will pay 
employees their wages in lieu of direct 
deposit into checking accounts, which 
some employees may not have.  Prepaid 
cards have also been used to distribute 
payments after natural disasters.  As 
the authors explain, network-branded 
general spending reloadable cards offer 
functions similar to traditional credit 
and debit cards.  Their transactions 
are processed using the same systems 
as these network brands (MasterCard, 
Visa, American Express, or Discover) 
and the cards can be used to withdraw 
funds from ATMs, to make retail pur-
chases, or to pay bills in person, online, 
or by phone wherever the network 
brand is accepted. 
The study uses transactions and 
cardholder demographic data from four 
general spending prepaid card provid-
ers – a random sample of 500 card-
holders was drawn from each of the 
four firms, resulting in a sample of over 
1900 active cardholders.  Transactions 
for each cardholder were tracked over 
a 12-month period during 2005-2006.  
These data were augmented with in-
formation obtained during discussions 
with other industry providers.  The 
analysis suggests that many providers 
are marketing their cards to under-
banked customers, a potentially sizable 
market.  Most cardholders spend 
nearly all of the funds loaded onto 
their cards each month – they are not 
using the cards as a store of value but 
as a transactions method.  They use 
the cards mainly for point-of-sale pur-
chases and not to withdraw cash from 
an ATM, suggesting that the cards 
may be acting as a substitute for cash.  
The analysis indicates that the average 
cardholder loads funds onto his card 
once a month and the average amount 
loaded is $217.  The average cardholder 
makes 3.5 point-of-sale transactions 
per month, each averaging a little less 
than $40.  And he withdraws funds 
from an ATM less than once a month, 
with the average amount of withdrawal 
a little more than $40.  The authors’ 
study is one of the first to document 
the usage of these types of cards.  They 
suggest that one avenue for future 
research is to augment their data with 
information from consumers about 
their motivations for using such cards.
Victor Stango of Dartmouth 
College discussed the two papers on 
alternative financial services.  As he 
pointed out, there are clearly new 
alternatives available to the under-
banked, but given the high cost of 
these alternatives, the question is 
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users.  The DeYoung and Phillips 
paper discusses the high cost of payday 
lending.  Stango indicated that the 
cost of prepaid cards is also very high. 
He estimated, based on the data in the 
Rhine, et al. paper, that the average 
cardholder has a monthly balance of 
between $100 and $200 and pays about 
$20 in fees per month.  Stango posed 
some questions for future research: 
Why do people use these alternative 
financial services given their high cost?   
Do consumers have sufficient informa-
tion to make informed usage decisions?   
Are the markets for these alternatives 
operating as one might expect a com-
petitive market to operate?  
The conference concluded with 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke speaking on the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act (CRA).  As 
the Chairman explained, the CRA 
affirmed the obligation of federally 
insured depository institutions, which 
benefit from access to the financial 
safety net, including federal deposit 
insurance and the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window, to help meet the 
credit needs of their communities, in 
a safe and sound manner.  But over 
the 30 years since it was enacted, the 
CRA has evolved with the financial 
services industry.  When the CRA 
was passed in 1977, many felt that 
poor conditions in American cities, 
and in particular in lower-income and 
minority neighborhoods, were partly 
caused by limited credit availability.  
As Chairman Bernanke explained, the 
CRA and other legislation passed in 
the 1970s, including the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing 
Act, and the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act, were intended to reduce 
credit-related discrimination, expand 
access to credit, and increase the 
information available to assess lending 
patterns.  The banking industry has 
undergone significant changes since 
then, with interstate banking and 
branching, industry consolidation, the 
rise of the secondary mortgage market, 
and securitization.  Banks have gained 
experience in underwriting loans in 
lower-income neighborhoods.  Chair-
man Bernanke cited a Federal Reserve 
study that indicated that in general, 
CRA-related mortgage lending was at 
least somewhat profitable and usu-
ally did not involve disproportionately 
higher default rates than non-CRA 
mortgage lending (Avery, Bostic, and 
Canner, 2000). 
In 1995, the CRA regulations 
were amended to emphasize 
performance over process and to 
lessen the compliance burden.  Large 
institutions’ compliance with CRA 
would be judged based on their 
performance with respect to lending, 
investments, and services, and small 
banks would be allowed to meet 
their requirements via a streamlined 
examination that focuses on lending 
activities.  In 2005, further refinements 
were made, including expanding the 
definition of community development 
to cover activities that benefit middle-
income communities in distressed 
rural areas and in disaster areas.  
Chairman Bernanke said that the 
CRA will have to continue to evolve 
to reflect changes in financial markets 
and in the economy. He concluded his 
talk by pointing out some of the chal-
lenges that lay ahead. First, defining 
“local community” is becoming more 
difficult as institutions become more 
national in scope and with the advent 
of nontraditional delivery mechanisms 
like the Internet. Second, nonbank 
institutions are becoming more impor-
tant providers of financial services to 
lower-income communities. But these 
institutions are not subject to CRA. 
Third, access to credit in lower-income 
communities has increased, but more 
lending does not necessarily imply bet-
ter outcomes. Distinguishing beneficial 
from harmful lending poses a chal-
lenge for regulators as they seek to en-
sure that the CRA continues to assist 
community economic development.
The presentations and discussion 
at the 2007 Federal Reserve System 
Community Affairs Research Confer-
ence help illuminate several aspects of 
community reinvestment and devel-
opment finance. They also suggest 
that much remains to be learned. It is 
hoped that this conference will inspire 
further rigorous research in this area. 
The CRA affirmed the obligation of federally 
insured depository institutions, which benefit 
from access to the financial safety net, to help 
meet the credit needs of their communities, in 
a safe and sound manner. 
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